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Abstract
We use the imposition of a non remunerated reserve on short term
borrowing in Chile in 1991 as a cuasi natural experiment to test the
eﬀects of an increase in the cost of short term borrowing on capital
structure and investment. The diﬀerential impact of this regulatory
measure across firms allows us to perform a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
analysis. We find a drastic drop in short term borrowing of regu-
lated firms that was almost completely oﬀset by additional long term
borrowing. The nature of the experiment allows us to isolate a clear
causality from changes in the cost of funds to capital structure, solving
some of the endogeneity problems present in preexisting literature.
1 Introduction
The eﬀect of financing constraints on firm behavior has attracted the at-
tention of empirical corporate finance. The existing literature explores how
asymmetric information, agency costs or market imperfections in general may
alter the availability of funds and the optimal liability structure of a firm.
These problems, in turn, may aﬀect the investment policy of firms. While
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there is abundant literature on financing constraints and investment (See
for example Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988 or Kaplan and Zingales
1997), very few articles have taken care of the potential endogeneity prob-
lems that arise in regressions that relate on the one hand the investment
policy of the firm and on the other hand measures of its capital structure.
The diﬃculty in this type of exercise is to find an exogenous source of varia-
tion for the determinants of firms’ capital structure that is uncorrelated with
the firm´s investment opportunities and, at the same time, has some cross
sectional variation across firms. Because this diﬃculty, just few attempts
to isolate the causality from financing constraints to real eﬀects have been
developed. Some recent examples of those attempts have shown interesting
results. Banerjee and Duflo (2004), use as a natural experiment changes in
a direct credit lending program in India and investigate its impact on how
both constrained and unconstrained firms reacted to it. They conclude that
there is no evidence that directed credit is used as a substitute for other
forms of credit. Likewise, Paravisini (2004) uses a credit market intervention
in Argentina that changed exogenously the financial position of banks. He
finds evidence that banks are liquidity constrained and hold private informa-
tion about borrowers that hinders substitution of financing sources. Finally,
Massa et al (2004) use the inclusion of firms on the S&P500 index as an
exogenous shock, where the eﬀect of index addition on the stock price does
not depend on the management of firms. They find that companies experi-
ence a decrease in their cost of equity and react to this exogenous event by
modifying their corporate financial and investment policies.
This paper intends to isolate the causality from changes in the cost of
borrowing to capital structure by exploring the eﬀects of the imposition of
a legal constraint in foreign borrowing on local firms, taking as a natural
experiment a control to short-term capital inflows imposed in Chile in 1991.
By using data of financial statements and the amount of foreign borrowing
of firms we estimate the eﬀect of this exogenous shock that reduced avail-
ability of foreign borrowing for local firms. Figure 2 and Table 1 show the
aggregate eﬀect of this measure on foreign denominated loans. In the late
80s and up to 1990, the ratio of short-term debt to total debt denominated in
foreign currency was around 90%. However, in 1991 the percentage dropped
to 72.7% and it continued decreasing in the following years to finally reach a
small portion of the total debt in 1997 (2.8%). This is precisely the period in
which the legal constraint in foreign borrowing was in place. The experiment
we chose is interesting as long as some firms suddenly and unexpectedly faced
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a drastic increase in the cost of their short term funding, while others -those
that previously had either restricted access to international markets or those
that did not have access to dollar denominated loans at all- remained rela-
tively unaﬀected. Hence the experiment allows us to evaluate the diﬀerential
eﬀects of this measure on firms with diﬀerent exposure to it. By having a
clear control group we are able to identify the causal eﬀects the shock has
on the capital structure of firms and, in turn, to evaluate the real eﬀects
induced by the new capital structure. The size of the eﬀect in terms of cost
of capital and availability of funds for aﬀected firms is much larger than in
the few experiments already present in the preexisting literature. In addition,
the exogenous nature of such a measure allows us to avoid endogeneity, i.e.
that the changes in foreign borrowing of firms are leaded for variations in
their investment opportunities.
The exogenous shock that we use in this paper is the imposition of an
unremunerated reserve requirement to selective categories of capital inflows
by the Central Bank of Chile in June 1991. Under this control, foreign
investors were limited to hold a portion of their new short term borrowing
denominated in foreign currencies in an unremunerated fixed-term reserve
account at the Central Bank, with a minimum of 90 days and up to 1 year.
The initial percentage the reserve requirement was 20%.
We first identify firms obtaining foreign borrowing prior to the imposition
of the measure to further calculate the propensity of each firm to access for-
eign capital markets at the time the capital inflow restriction was imposed.
This propensity is estimated on the basis of lagged variables over a long
period previous to the imposition of the reserve requirement and therefore
measures the likelihood of a firm to have access to foreign currency denom-
inated loans at the time when the capital restriction was introduced. Then,
we use this propensity to construct a diﬀerence in diﬀerences estimator that
we relate to diﬀerent capital structure measures. Our results show that firms
that were more likely to obtain foreign borrowing were actually restricted
by the imposition of this unremunerated reserve requirement, and that they
tended to substitute borrowing subject to the capital control for loan cate-
gories exempt from it. Furthermore, the eﬀects of controls to capital inflows
are not uniform across groups of firms; then firms more heavily aﬀected are
those that have relatively more propensity to finance their operations with
foreign borrowing.
The eﬀect of this unremunerated reserve requirement has already at-
tracted substantial attention at a macroeconomic level. The existing litera-
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ture has concentrated on potential eﬀects on exchange rate appreciation (Soto
and Valdés-Prieto 1996), changes in composition of capital inflows (Soto and
Valdés-Prieto 1996, Eyzaguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel 1997, and Singh 2000),
or the degree of autonomy of the Central Bank in applying its monetary
policy (Edwards 1998). At a microeconomic level the focus has been primar-
ily on measuring the impact of the unremunerated reserve requirement on
the general balance structure and the cost of capital for firms (Gallego and
Hernandez 2003). However, there are no studies that compare the relative
impact of the measure according to the relative exposure of firms to foreign
borrowing.
Along with the interesting results we obtain related to the eﬀects of fi-
nancing constraints on firms´ policies, some useful insights can be drawn
for designing financial policy related to capital controls. These issues might
be of particular interest considering the debate ignited about the sources of
the instability for international financial markets since the Mexico crisis in
1994-95, as well as the subsequent crisis in Russia, Brazil, and East Asia
in 1997-98. Since then, controls to more volatile capital inflows have been
considered a useful way to isolate local economies from volatility not related
to their underlying economic fundamentals. The evidence provided by this
paper indicates that at a microeconomic level, local firms are not uniformly
aﬀected by the imposition of such controls, and they tend to adapt their
capital structure to the new economic and financial conditions by reducing
non-exempted items and substituing them by exempted borrowing. There-
fore, in imposing controls some of these findings may be considered.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly describes
the economic environment in which the rise in capital inflows to Chile led the
Central Bank to apply the regulation, as well as it characterizes the unremu-
nerated reserve requirement. Section 3 includes the pre-existing evidence and
it justifies the experiment we develop based on the exogeneity of the measure,
showing evidence that its imposition was unexpected by local firms, and so
it had important eﬀects. Section 4 characterizes the data we used and it
describes our identification strategy, including the equations we estimate. In
section 5 we show the results of our empirical analysis. In the final section
we draw some conclusions.
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2 Background
2.1 Capital Inflows to Chile in late 80s and early 90s
After a period of shortage of foreign currency reserves that followed the
1982 crisis, in the late 1980s and early 1990s Chilean economy faced massive
inflows of foreign capital, which averaged 6.2% of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) over the period 1990-94. These inflows made excessive pressure on
domestic asset prices and so they resulted in a wealth eﬀect that led to
unsustainable increases in consumption and investment. In addition, these
foreign capital inflows involved real exchange rate appreciation as demand for
Chilean peso increased, which eroded the competitiveness of the exporting-
oriented Chilean economic model.
In order to cope with the potential inflationary pressures resulting from
the high growth rates in consumption and investment, along with protecting
the exporting sector, the Central Bank of Chile decided to increase interest
rates of short term public bonds used to adjust the monetary base in January
1990. The increase of 190 basis points encouraged even further international
investors to make arbitrage between international and local rates. A sig-
nificant portion of foreign capital arrived in the form of shorter-term funds
(Agosin & Ffrench-Davis, 1996), either as portfolio capital or short-term
credits.1 2
To deal with the potential source of risk that short term inflows bring
with, Chilean authorities adopted policies to partially insulate the economy
from their negative impacts, to prevent an excessive appreciation of the cur-
rency and to maintain autonomy in the implementation of the monetary
policy given the crawling-peg exchange rate rule present at the time. Three
instruments were mostly used: (a) imposition of taxes and reserve require-
ments to capital inflows; (b) a “crawling-peg” exchange-rate policy based on
“dirty floating” of the exchange rate with respect to a reference value pegged
to a basket of currencies; (c) open-market operations to sterilize the mone-
1The public bonds were the "Pagaré Reajustable del Banco Central" (PRBC) with a
maturity of 90 days to 1 year, and the "Pagaré Descontable del Banco Central" (PDBC)
with a maturity of 30 days.
2While the former was characterized by purchases of debt and equity securities such
as stocks, bonds and money-market instruments -and channeled mainly through foreign
mutual funds and through oﬀerings of shares of Chilean companies on the New York
Stock Exchange via American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (Ffrench-Davis et al., 1995)-
the latter, was basically represented by short-term bank lending.
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tary eﬀects of exchange-rate transactions. All those measures were framed
into a strictly prudent supervision and a continuous deepening of financial
markets.3
The "dirty floating" of the local exchange rate exposed the Central Bank
to an excessive purchasing of international reserves, which were sterilized
by doing open-market operations, which pressured local interest rates even
more and encouraged capital inflows even further. Because of this diﬃculty
in finding a balance between the monetary and exchange rate policies, the
Central Bank established an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) to
prevent the massive inflows of highly volatile capital.4
2.2 The Unremunerated Reserve Requirement
The Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) was a control to short-
term capital inflows imposed by the Central Bank of Chile in June 1991. It
required investors to hold a portion of some selective categories of those short-
term inflows -minimum of 90 days and up to 1 year- in an unremunerated
fixed-term reserve account at the Central Bank. The rate for the URR was
initially imposed at 20% for all new foreign borrowings, except for credits
provided directly to Chilean exporters by foreign importers whose shipment
occurred within six months (trade credit).5 The reserve requirement was
established in the same currency than the credit and the holding period was
equal to the loan maturity with a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of
one year.
Initially, credits linked to foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, those
whose disbursement would occur abroad as well as those that would be used
abroad were exempted. Instead of maintaining the required deposit in the
unremunerated account, the Central Bank also oﬀered foreign investors the
option to pay an equivalent up-front payment, which was the financial cost
associated with the portion of the investment that should have been otherwise
3For a description of these policies see Cifuentes et. al. (2002)
4The selling of those public bonds at high rates brought up an unbalanced position
for the Central Bank balance sheet. As long as the exchange rate continued decreasing —
because capital inflows kept strong- Central Bank international reserves decreased in local
currency value; on the other hand, bonds that the Central Bank issued to sterilize the
increase in monetary base were issued at higher rates.
5The new reserve requirement was applied only for the external borrowing starting
after June 17, 1991.
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maintained at the Central Bank. The up front fee was equal to the product
of the relevant foreign interest rate and the fraction of capital subject to the
restriction. The relevant interest rate applied was the London Inter-Bank
Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) plus a specified spread.6
The URR’s features were changed over time between its starting date
in June 1991 and September 1998 when it was finally dropped to zero. At
the beginning, changes aimed at either to increase the eﬀectiveness of the
control or to close existing loopholes that allowed firms to partially elude it.
Inversely, when in the second half of the 1990s inflows became scarce, changes
were intended to reduce restrictions and so attract foreign capital. Features
like the percentage rate or fraction of deposit, the category of the inflows
subject to it, the holding period, the foreign currency in which the reserve
deposit or fee payment could be denominated, the restrictions on the rollover
of maturing investments, and other administrative requirements related to it
were modified.7
3 Impact of the experiment
3.1 Pre-Existing Evidence
Since the Mexico crisis in 1994-95 and the economic debacles in Russia,
Brazil, and East Asia in 1997-98, the desirability of capital controls has
been in the centre of the economic debate. Prominent economists, including
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have advocated for its imposition after those
disastrous events.
In particular, the experience of Chile in imposing controls on capital
inflows has been extensively studied and often mentioned as a successful
example of such controls. However, academic literature has mostly focused
on measuring its macroeconomic consequences and their correlation with the
policy objectives pursued by the Central Bank. Issues drawn have been: (a)
the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy under a crawling peg exchange rate rule
(Eyzaguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel 1997, Edwards 1998, De Gregorio, Edwards
and Valdés 2000) 8; (b) the contribution of the URR to a more depreciated
6In July 1991 the margin above LIBOR was fixed at 2.5%.
7See Annex 1 for a chronology.
8A “crawling-peg” exchange-rate policy based on “dirty floating” of the exchange rate
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real exchange rate (Soto and Valdés-Prieto 1996); (c) to what extent URR
reduced total capital inflows or changed their composition from short term
(or financial) to long-term inflows (or non-financial) (Soto and Valdés-Prieto
1996, Singh 2000)9; (d) and to what extent URR partially isolated Chilean
economy from contagion from external shocks.
In a microeconomic perspective, some previous literature already gives us
some evidence on the impact of the imposition of the URR on the Chilean
firms that had access to foreign capital markets. However, the attention has
not defined causality; rather it has focused mostly on measuring the eﬀects
of capital controls on firms’ capital structure. In this regard, by analyzing
the eﬀects of URR on 73 Chilean firms during its application, Gallego and
Hernandez (2003) find that the URR introduced a distortion that changed the
funding patterns and costs of funds for firms, but the eﬀects were, however,
not uniform across groups of firms. In terms of the composition of debt, they
argue that firms shortened the maturity of debt while, at the same time,
reduced the relatively short-term financial debt.
3.2 Exogeneity of individual borrowing
The imposition of the URR responded to the reasons already explained in
section . The appreciation of the exchange rate, the high growth rates in
consumption and investment that increased asset prices, and the necessity
to reduce the costly sterilization of the monetary base produced by capital
inflows, forced the Central Bank to introduce the capital control. Therefore,
there might be considered that a potential correlation between the aggregate
expenditure and the imposition of the URR is present. This endogeneity
would come from the fact that, at the aggregate level, the excess of expen-
diture -partly because the increasing foreign borrowing- might have forced
the Central Bank to impose the URR. If so, the shock might be related
endogenously to the aggregate investment opportunities of firms as a whole.
However, unlike the behavior at the aggregate, individual firms faced the
imposition of the reserve requirement as an exogenous shock since they did
with respect to a reference value pegged to a basket of currencies was in place until
September 1999. Since then a free float was adopted.
9According to Singh, between 1991 and 1996, short term inflows decreased from 72%
of total inflows to just 3.2%. According to Edwards (1999), when residual instead of
contractual maturity is used, the proportion of short-term flows is higher.
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not internalize their individual contribution to the increase in the aggregate
demand for foreign credit. Furthermore, given that our identification strategy
relies on the diﬀerential impact of the URR across firms we should not be
capturing the relationship between aggregate investment opportunities and
the imposition of the capital control.
In order to give further evidence of this exogeneity, we first take into
account the public information available at the moment in which the URR
was introduced, as a way to evaluate if individual firms could foresee the
imposition of the URR before it actually was in place. Hence, we searched
all the references to unremunerated reserve requirement in the news in all
the major financial and non-financial publications available between January
1, 1990 and December 31, 1995. 10
As it can be seen in Figure 1, there was no public information about the
URR either in the first or the second quarter of 1991. The first information
about the URR in the international financial news appeared in the third
quarter 1991 —specifically in July 1991-, i.e. more than one month later the
URR was introduced by the Central Bank. As there is this delay in the
appearance about the URR, it is likely that local firms did not expect the
introduction of the capital control on short-term foreign borrowing, and it
was therefore totally unexpected by the market. After the first news was
publicly known, other five references to the URR appeared in 1992, along
with three references in 1993, and just one in 1994. The most of the news
in the international financial press are concentrated in 1995, when 25 news
appeared, which in fact represents more than 71% of the total news appeared
in the period considered.
3.3 Eﬀect on total borrowing of individual firms
The natural experiment setting we have chosen may be characterized by its
exogeneity, as the shock restricted unexpectedly the supply of foreign bor-
rowing that local firms were able to get. The rough impact of the URR can
be seen observing the decrease in aggregate inflows and the change in their
composition. Table 1 shows the amount (in USD million) and the composi-
tion of the aggregate inflows arrived to Chile between 1988 and 1997, which
covers the period in which URR was in place. Also, Table 1 shows the de-
10The news were searched in the Lexis-Nexis database with tickers “reserve requirement
AND Chile”, “Encaje AND Chile”, and “Capital Controls AND Chile”.
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posits in the Central Bank due to reserve requirements. It can be seen that
the composition shifted dramatically after 1990 because URR requirements
tend to change the term composition of the capital flows received by Chilean
economy towards relatively long term and more stable flows such as foreign
direct investment (FDI). In the aggregate, just between 1990 and 1992, the
proportion of short term flows into the total flows decreased from 90.3%
to 28.9%, and it continued declining up until 1997, when short term flows
amounted only 2.8% of the total flows arrived.11 In particular, between the
twelve-months period between December 1990-1991 the decline in the pro-
portion of short term foreign inflows amounted almost 18 percentage points,
decreasing to 72.7% at the end of 1991.
Also at individual level local firms were impacted significantly by the
URR. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the average foreign debt for firms that
received foreign borrowing within a period of twelve quarters, between the
first quarter 1990 and the fourth quarter 1992, i.e. six quarters before and
after the moment of the imposition of URR. The index was constructed taking
into account the average debt for all firms in that twelve-quarters window,
and it is 100 for the average of all the firms in the sample. Even though
there is a decrease in the second quarter of 1990 (related to the huge eﬀect
of the credits of largest companies maturing at that time) it can be easily
seen a systematic decline in the index after the third quarter 1991. Although
URR was imposed at the end of the second quarter 1991, firms’ borrowing
was maybe impacted with some delay as there was outstanding borrowing
that could not be adjusted automatically. Hence, the decline in the index is
consistent with the idea of exogeneity of individual borrowing and that local
firms had no expectations of the imposition of URR.
Even though the decrease after third quarter 1991 is clear, we expect
that movements in foreign inflows of largest companies represent a heavy
proportion of the total. To avoid the problem of excessive weight of large
firms into the total eﬀect we calculated the ratio of foreign debt to average
foreign debt by firm for the same twelve-month period than in the previous
index. Figure 3 shows the average of this ratio for the sample of firms. The
decrease in the ratio is significant if we consider that between the first quarter
of 1991 and the third quarter of 1991 it declined 28.4%.
11It is noteworthy that URR was in place until mid-1998.
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4 Methodology
In this paper we intend to find the causal eﬀects of the imposition of controls
to capital inflows on the balance structure of firms. We use the imposition
of the URR as a shock that exogenously reduced the amount of foreign bor-
rowing that local firms could access to. In so doing, we are able to estimate
causality in a context of a natural experiment setting, because the sudden
restriction to the availability of foreign funds for local firms is independent of
their investment opportunities. This approach, therefore, allows us to find a
clean relationship between the behavior of firms and the restrictions they face
to access foreign capital, avoiding the potential endogeneity that arises from
the fact that the changes in foreign borrowing of firms are led by variations
in the marginal productivity of their investments.
4.1 Data
Before proceeding with the empirical specifications, we first describe the data
sources we used. For our analysis we merged two diﬀerent datasets containing
information of individual firms. The first source we used details information
of financial statements of firms -balance sheet and profit and loss statements-
between 1986 and 2003 on a quarterly basis. The average number of firms in
this sample in each quarter is around 550 firms. These firms correspond to
those that have listed public instruments in the Superintendencia de Valores
y Seguros in Chile (SVS), and so they are obliged to provide the public with
financial information on a quarterly basis, according to the standard "Ficha
Estadística Codificada Uniforme" (FECU). Our estimates are based on the
sub sample that lasts from the last quarter 1989 to the last quarter 1992, i.e.
six months before and after the date the URR was introduced.
The second source we used is also financial information contained in the
database Fecus-Plus, which is an electronic database that contains the FE-
CUs in an electronic format. In this case, a panel of 229 firms was con-
structed on a quarterly basis between the first quarter 1990 and the first
quarter 2003. Three additional variables that do not belong to FECUs were
added to this database: the foreign private debt per firm, the prices of deriva-
tives transactions (forwards) maturing up to one year, and their amounts.
This information is recorded by the Gerencia de Análisis y Operaciones In-
ternacionales and the Gerencia de Comercio Exterior y de Política Comercial
of the Central Bank of Chile. Given that firms must inform the amount of
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foreign borrowing they received to the Central Bank of Chile in order to meet
exchange rate regulations at the time, we were able to identify a subset of
firms with the characteristic of having actually received foreign borrowing in
that period. In this database each observation represents an inflow for the
firm i in the period of time t. There were 76 firms in the sub sample that
actually received foreign debt, either in some or all the twelve quarters.
4.2 Identification Strategy
In order to identify the diﬀerential eﬀect of the imposition of the URR across
firms we first constructed a measure of the propensity of diﬀerent firms to
raise funding denominated in foreign currency. To do so we run a probit
regression on the six quarters previous to the imposition in which the depen-
dent variable is a dummy variable (Debtit) that takes value zero for firms that
do not have any debt denominated in foreign currency and value one when-
ever firms do use foreign denominated debt. As independent variables we use
four lags of total assets (Assets) as a size variable, four lags of the return on
assets before interest and taxes (ROA) as a profitability measure, a general
time trend and sector specific dummies. This first stage of our analysis can
be summarized in Expression 1 where the subindex i corresponds to each
firm, t to each period (quarter), j to the relevant sector and k corresponds
to the number of lags.
Debtit = α+
4
Σ
k=1
βt−k Assetsit−k +
4
Σ
k=1
γt−k ROAit−k + λ t+ δj + εit (1)
We then predict the propensity of each firm in our sample to hold foreign
debt at the moment of the imposition of the URR defining a new variable
Propensityi = dDebti1991,2. The definition of this variable plays two roles in
our identification strategy:
The first role is to have an exogenous measure of the exposure of firms
to the impact of the URR that does not depend directly on the amount
of debt that they were holding at the moment of its imposition. Given
that Propensity is calculated as a function of lagged variables it does not
suﬀer from the possible endogeneity problems that could arise if we used as
a measure of exposure the eﬀective use of foreign debt. Furthermore some
firms might not have used foreign debt when the URR was imposed but were
aﬀected by the measure because the cost of potential future access to it was
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increased. As Propensityi captures the likelihood that a firm used foreign
debt this problem is at least partially mitigated.
The second role is to expand the sample of firms that we can use for our
analysis. The Debtit variable corresponds to the more restrictive sample of
229 firms for which we have more detailed data, while all the right hand side
variables in Expression 1 correspond to the full sample of 550 firms.
Once we have constructed our Propensity measure we use it to run stan-
dard diﬀerence in diﬀerences regressions to assess the impact of the intro-
duction of the URR on diﬀerent aspects of the firms´ capital structure and
behavior. For this analysis we use the six quarters previous to the introduc-
tion of the URR and the six quarters after its introduction. The Propensity
measure is used as a continuous treatment. The structure of each of these
regressions can be seen in expression 2:
Yit = θ PropensityExp+α+
4
Σ
k=1
βt−kAssetsit−k+
4
Σ
k=1
γt−k ROAit−k+δi+µt+εit
(2)
Where PropensityExp takes value zero in all periods prior to the in-
troduction of the URR and value equal to Propensity in all periods after
its introduction. The parameter of interest of this second stage is θ that
measures the diﬀerential change in Yit between a hypothetical firm that had
a 100% probability of using foreign debt and a firm with no probability at
all of using it. The inclusion of individual fixed eﬀects and time dummies
guarantees that the regression does not capture any preexisting diﬀerences
between the treated and non treated firms nor a general time change on the
dependent variable.
The dependent variables included in the second stage of regressions are
all measures of capital structure measured as a proportion of the total assets
of the firm. In particular short term debt corresponds to the short term
debt of the firm (maturity below one year) over total assets, extended short
term debt also includes the portion of long term debt with maturity lower
than one year, long term debt measures the long term debt of the firm as a
proportion of total assets, total debt is the leverage ratio of the firm, short
term liabilities includes short term debt and other liabilities such as promised
dividends or provisions over total asset, long term liabilities is the equivalent
ratio for maturities longer than one year and excludes the net value of the
firm. Finally trade credit is the ratio of trade credit over total assets.
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5 Results
5.1 First stage
Table 2 shows the results of the probit regression corresponding to the first
stage of our estimation. The total number of observations is 6,265 and the
R-square of this regression is 0.187. The most significant variable is year
the (trend) that has a negative relationship with Propensity.The variable
quarter (not reported) is also significant. All the other variables, i.e. the
four lags in total assets (logtotalassets), and the four lags in ROAII help to
explain Propensity, although their individual statistical significance is low.
In general, the relationship between Propensity and lags in total assets (log-
totalactivos) is positive (except the first lag), while it is negative in the case
of the lags of ROAII. Note that the while individually each of the coeﬃcients
asociated with the independent variables is not statistically significant at 95%
confidence level, the joint explanatory power of these variables is relatively
high, reaching an R2 of 19%.
5.2 Second stage
Table 3 shows the estimated parameters for the second stage. There is a
negative and significant relationship between PropensityExp and short term
debt, as well as to the extended short term debt (Columns 1 and 2). The re-
duction in short-term debt is almost 2.75%, while in the case of the extended
short term debt the decrease is 1.93%. If we consider that the diﬀerence
between the first and the third quartile is 0.21 percentual points, therefore
the diﬀerential eﬀect in short term debt is 0.57% (in the case of the extended
short term debt the diﬀerential eﬀect reaches 0.42%), which represents an
important impact for firms.
The relationship between PropensityExp and long term debt is also pos-
itive and significant (Column 3). The increase in long term debt induced by
PropensityExp is about 3%. However, the relation between PropensityExp
and total liabilities is positive but not significantly diﬀerent from zero (Col-
umn 4). from these results some useful issues arise. First, firms were eﬀec-
tively impacted by the exogenous shock produced by the URR , i.e. there
was a causal eﬀect between the imposition of the restriction and the foreign
borrowing of firms. Second, firms were aﬀected diﬀerently among groups.
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Those that previously had a higher propension to borrow using foreign debt
were more heavily impacted than those that had a lower propension. Third,
firms tended to substitute exempted (short term) for not-exempted (long
term) debt, with a practically null eﬀect on total debt.
Overall, the results in columns one to four of Table 3 indicate that the
imposition of the URR made the firms that had access to borrowing denom-
inated in foreign currencies substituted away from short-term borrowing, in-
creasing their long-term. Furthermore the substitution is almost full. While
we are not able to measure directly what part of this substitution corresponds
to foreign denominated debt, our identification strategy along with the evo-
lution of aggregate borrowing indicates that this substitution was largely
between debt denominated in foreign currencies. Taking into account that
the objective of the introduction of the URR was to reduce the exposure of
the Chilean economy to the volatility of short term international inflows of
capital, the evidence that we find is quite supportive of the success of the
measure.
Table 4 shows the results for variables that consider a broader definition
of total liabilities. As it was mentioned above, this variables contain not only
debt but also other sources of firms’ funding -like accounts payables, credi-
tors other than banks, deferred taxes, provisions, dividends, etc. Hence, when
those variables are considered, PropensityExp has a negative and significant
impact on short term liabilities about 9.9% (Column 1). This negative rela-
tionship indicates that firms also tended to reduce their reliance on almost
all types of short term funding, not only short term debt.
As it was found before in the case of long term debt, the relation between
PropensityExp and long term liabilities is also positive and significant (Col-
umn 2). Long term liabilities increased in 2.6% as a result of the exogenous
shock faced by firms. Therefore, when a broader definition of liabilities is con-
sidered, it can be seen that substitution of exempted (long term liabilities)
for non-exempted (short term liabilities) is also present.
It is noteworthy, however, the decrease in almost 2% in trade credit (Col-
umn 3). Financial theory indicates that firms would typically substitute
trade credit when they face rationing on borrowing. In this case, however,
substitution does not seem to be present. it is likely the case that firms
faced problems to substitute trade credit by non-exempted liabilities, may
be because direct trade credit was exempted from the URR only if shipment
occurred within six months. The possibility to substitute was limited then.
Also, the higher cost related to trade credit must have played a role. How-
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ever, further research should be done in order to explain this eﬀect in more
detail.
Overall, the results in Table 4 reflect the adjustment of non-debt parts
of the balance sheet to the rebalancing of debt maturity generated by the
imposition of the URR.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence of the reaction of domestic firms to an exoge-
nous shock in the cost of foreign borrowing. We explore the eﬀects of the
imposition of a legal constraint to short term foreign borrowing and find that
local firms reduce their reliance on short term borrowing while they increase
long term borrowing. However we do not find a significant eﬀect with respect
to total borrowing.
Taking the natural experiment provided by the imposition of a control to
short-term capital inflows in Chile in 1991, we avoid the endogeneity prob-
lems associated to most studies on capital structure dynamics, namely that
reductions in foreign borrowing may come from changes in the investment
opportunities of firms. We are able to isolate the causality between the un-
expected restriction in foreign borrowing and firms’ behavior. Local firms
substitute exempted by non-exempted sources, in this case typically long
term debt by short term debt. Furthermore, they adjust not only the non-
exempted type of borrowing but almost all type of short term sources of
funds.
The eﬀect of the unexpected shock is also diﬀerent across groups of firms.
By constructing a measure of the firm’s propensity to acquire foreign debt
we have an exogenous measure of their exposure of the impact of the URR.
An important feature of this propensity is that it does not depend on the
amount of debt that firms held at the moment of the shock. By identifying
firm’s propension rather than firm’s use of foreign debt we avoid to associate
a potential restriction in foreign borrowing to firms that decided not to use
them. Therefore, the potential endogeneity that could arise from a measure
of exposure based on the eﬀective use of firms of foreign debt was avoided.
Results indicate that those firms initially more exposed to foreign borrowing
were relatively more aﬀected by the shock than firms that were either less
exposed or that those that had no exposure at all.
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Finally, the paper provides some useful insights that can be drawn in
terms of policy implications. The results indicate that once a legal and un-
expected restriction on foreign borrowing is imposed firms may be heavily
aﬀected, primarily those more exposed to use that type of funding as a source
of their operations. In the case of emerging markets for instance, those firms
can be typically bigger firms, which because their size can access to interna-
tional capital markets. Furthermore, since the impact of the restriction may
force those firms to make adjustments in their capital structure such that
they rely on long term debt beyond the optimal equilibrium, even potential
liquidity problems for the whole economy might arise.
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Annex 1
- Credits granted by foreign commercial banks to Chilean commercial
banks as part of restructuring packages were exempted from 20% URR
- An alternative means of satisfying the 20% URR in the form of a special
repurchase agreement with the Central Bank was established. In June 27
1991 the URR was allowed to be a front fee payment, equal to the financial
cost of the URR using LIBOR for the calculation. Also, URR was extended
to all credits whose disbursement would occur abroad and those that would
be used abroad, along with credits linked to FDI projects. This extension
covered a “loophole” that remained open since the imposition of the URR.
- In July 1991, the 20% URR was extended to existing credits, except
for credits with maturity of less than 6 months. The requirement on exist-
ing credits maturing between July 11 and December 31, however, would be
phased.
- In January 23rd 1992, URR was extended to foreign exchange denomi-
nated term deposits held at commercial banks by domestic and foreign resi-
dents (which also represented a previous loophole)
- In May 28 1992, URR was risen up to 30 percent, with the exemption
of direct borrowing by firms (it remained at 20%). The holding period was
set at one year for all flows. In August 19th 1992, URR is set uniformly at
30 percent.
- Also in May the front fee payment was calculated at LIBOR + 2.5%.
Afterwards in October 30 1992 the paid-up front fee increased to LIBOR +
4%.
-In October 1993, shipment of merchandise using trade credit -already
exempt from URR- was enlarge and allowed to occur within 300 days (it
increased the loophole)
- In November 1994 the up front fee becomes payable only in dollars
- In July 4 1995, secondary ADRs become subject to the URR, since
these are not longer considered as foreign direct investment (FDI). Other
inward financial–non-FDI and non- primary ADRs– become subject to the
URR. (Closes a loophole. (Note: since primary ADRs were considered capital
additions, they were never subject to the URR.)
- In December 1995 all the new foreign borrowing to prepay other loans
was exempted from URR, when these new loans were of equal or shorter
maturity than the remaining maturity of the (old) loan to be repaid
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- In June 1996, foreign credits were not allowed to be rolled over more
than once within a year (it closes another loophole)
- In October 23, 1996 FDI classifies as such–and is exempt from URR–
only if it increases productive capacity (The FDI committee is in charge of
determining whether the attempted investment classifies as
FDI).
- In December 5th 1996 Foreign borrowing for up to US$ 200,000 (or
US$ 0.5 MM per year) is exempted from URR. In March 1997 the minimum
amount for exemption of the URR was reduced to US$ 100,000 in 12 months
- In April 18, 1997 The remittance of funds–principal and profits–from
investments by Chileans abroad is exempt from URR
- In September 22, 1997 The proceeds from closing positions in derivatives
(options) in foreign markets becomes exempt from the URR
- June 1998 URR was reduced to 10 percent, except for credit lines and
foreign currency denominated deposits
- August 1998 URR was eliminated for secondary ADRs. This had the
objective of recovering liquidity for ADRs, and reversing the declining volume
of transactions in the local stock market.
- September 16, 1998 URR was reduced to 0 percent
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Table 1: Aggregate Flows
Year Shor-term flows % of Total Long-term flows % of Total Total Deposits*
1988 916,564 96.3 34,838 3.7 951,402 -
1989 1,452,595 95.0 77,122 5.0 1,529,717 -
1990 1,683,149 90.3 181,419 9.7 1,864,568 -
1991 521,198 72.7 196,115 27.3 717,313 587
1992 225,197 28.9 554,072 71.1 779,269 11,424
1993 159,462 23.6 515,147 76.4 674,609 41,280
1994 161,575 16.5 819,699 83.5 981,274 87,039
1995 69,675 6.2 1,051,829 93.8 1,121,504 38,752
1996 67,254 3.2 2,042,456 96.8 2,109,710 172,320
1997 81,131 2.8 2,805,882 97.2 2,887,013 331,572
* Deposits in the Banco Central de Chile due to reserve requirements
Source: Central bank of Chile
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Table 2: First Stage
Use of foreign debt
log (total assets)t−1 -0.0994
[9.48]***
log (total assets)t−2 [0.57]
0.0652
log (total assets)t−3 [0.28]
0.2710
log (total assets)t−4 0.1726
[1.26]
Return on assetst−1 -0.1461
[0.67]
Return on assetst−2 -0.0441
[0.16]
Return on assetst−3 -0.2419
[1.46]
Return on assetst−4 -0.0070
[0.21]
year -0.0599
[9.48]***
Observations 6265
Pseudo R2 0.19
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Second Stage
1 2 3 4
Short Term Debt Ext Short Term Debt Long Term Debt Total Debt
PropensityExp -0.0268 -0.0200 0.0295 0.0122
[2.78]*** [1.89]* [2.72]*** [0.86]
l1log (total assets)t−1 0.018 0.018 0.003 0.024
[3.11]*** [2.88]*** [0.50] [2.82]***
l2log (total assets)t−2 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.005
[0.21] [0.06] [0.59] [0.46]
l3log (total assets)t−3 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010
[0.46] [0.45] [0.48] [0.93]
l4log (total assets)t−4 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.014
[0.23] [0.77] [1.39] [1.77]*
Return on assetst−1 -0.030 -0.044 -0.025 -0.066
[2.22]** [2.48]** [1.37] [2.78]***
Return on assetst−2 0.0002 0.014 -0.012 0.004
[0.01] [0.77] [0.62] [0.17]
Return on assetst−3 -0.017 -0.029 -0.020 -0.047
[1.02] [1.49] [1.02] [1.83]*
Return on assetst−4 -0.009 -0.021 -0.020 -0.028
[0.66] [1.38] [1.31] [1.40]
Observations 2351 2342 2385 2332
Number of firms 242 240 245 239
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
All dependent variables measured as ratio over total assets
Fixed eﬀects included in all regressions
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4: Second Stage b
1 2 3
Short Term Liabilities Long Term Liabilites Trade Credit
(except provisions)
PropensityExp -0.0987 0.0255 -0.0200
[5.75]*** [2.45]** [2.58]***
log (total assets)t−1 -0.052 0.007 0.019
[4.92]*** [1.09] [4.31]***
log (total assets)t−2 0.010 0.004 -0.008
[0.75] [0.54] [1.33]
log (total assets)t−3 0.007 -0.004 -0.007
[0.58] [0.59] [1.16]
log (total assets)t−4 0.016 0.010 -0.001
[1.71]* [1.76]* [0.24]
Return on assetst−1 -0.068 -0.035 -0.003
[2.33]** [2.00]** [0.25]
Return on assetst−2 -0.012 -0.014 -0.057
[0.40] [0.76] [5.05]***
Return on assetst−3 -0.031 -0.041 -0.016
[0.98] [2.15]** [1.15]
Return on assetst−4 -0.036 -0.005 -0.013
[1.46] [0.36] [1.21]
Observations 2289 2370 2382
Number of firms 236 245 245
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.03
All dependent variables measured as ratio over total assets
Fixed eﬀects included in all regressions
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 1: Impact of URR on foreign currency denominated borrowing
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Figure 2: Impact of URR on foreign currency denominated borrowing
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Figure 3: Impact of URR on foreign currency denominated borrowing
Index of Foreign Debt (as a ratio of the average per firm)
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Figure 4: Impact of URR on cost of borrowing
Financial Cost of Foreign Credits
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
En
e-
90
En
e-
91
E
ne
-9
2
En
e-
93
En
e-
94
E
ne
-9
5
En
e-
96
En
e-
97
En
e-
98
E
ne
-9
9
En
e-
00
En
e-
01
E
ne
-0
2
E
ne
-0
3
En
e-
04
En
e-
05
%
LIBO 180d (US dollar)+URR
LIBO 180d (US dollar)
29
